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Abstract: The forest still covers an important share of land area in many developing 
countries and represents an important source of revenue for governments. Another major 
contribution to government revenues comes from printing money, namely the seigniorage. 
Building on a simple theoretical model where governments target inflation and aim at 
reducing deforestation while minimising a welfare loss function, we exhibit the potential 
substitution effect between seigniorage and deforestation revenues. Regressions run on a 
panel of developing countries show that there exists a non-negligible substitution effect 
between seigniorage and deforestation revenues, which is, as suggested by the theoretical 
model, even stronger if the endogenous character of seigniorage is taken into account. 
Adding variables suggested by the theoretical model as well as usual control variables in 
deforestation equations, do not alter the main result. As a consequence, disinflation 
policies as recommended by the IMF, may hasten deforestation. The model is extended to 
address this problem, which shows that international transfers dedicated to rainforest 
protection may upturn the positive correlation between tighter monetary policies and 
deforestation and give some additional support to REDD’s advocates. 
Keywords: deforestation, seigniorage, inflation, developing countries, panel data 
analysis. 
JEL codes: O13, Q23, E42, E52 
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Disinflation against the Environment? 
An application to the trade-off between seigniorage and deforestation 
The Copenhagen talks on climate change showed that participants at least agreed on the 
need to “slow, halt and eventually reverse” deforestation in developing countries. Six 
developed countries have pledged substantial amounts to fund a program to curb 
deforestation, which is considered as a substantial issuer of GHG. This appears to be a 
noticeable result since forests were dropped out the Kyoto Protocol because countries like 
Brazil were defending their sovereignty over their forests. Campaigns by environmental 
groups have managed to put a greater concern on forest contribution to climate change 
mitigation.1 Those environmental objectives are not only important in their own right; they 
also contribute to the achievement of economic development as stated in the Millennium 
Development Goals. These facts are probably not disconnected with respect to the expansion 
of the literature analyzing sustainable development issues in the last two decades (e.g. López 
& Toman, 2006). 
Recent data show that deforestation occurs since 1990 at a yearly pace of more than 8 
million hectares per year (see Table 1 and Appendix A). If Europe and North-America 
preserve their forest stock, developing countries areas (and in particular Africa and Central & 
South America) are most affected by deforestation. Forests cover in 2005 about 30% of the 
world land area, and close to one half of some regions of the world (46.2% in Central & South 
America, 44% in Western & Central Africa).  
                                                 
1
 The newly elected US President agenda makes reference to Al Gore’s 2000 report conclusions about global 
environment problems. Several political analysts do not exclude a cause-effect between the projection of the film 
“Home” (dealing with environment imbalances all over the world) and the increased number of seats of “Green” 
parties following the 2009 European Union Parliament elections. 
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Table 1 - Extent of and change in forested areas by geographic areas, 1990-2005 
 Areas Change rate Yearly (average) 
Change rate 
 1990 2005 1990-2005 1990-2005 
 1000 ha 1000 ha 1000 ha % 1000 ha % 
Europe 989 320 1 001 394 12 074 1.22% 805 +0.08% 
North America 677 801 677 464 -337 -0.05% -22   0.00% 
Asia 574 487 571 577 -2 910 -0.51% -194 -0.03% 
Oceania 212 514 206 254 -6 260 -2.95% -417 -0.20% 
Central & South America 923 807 859 925 -63 882 -6.92% -4 259 -0.46% 
Africa 699 361 635 412 -63 949 -9.14% -4 263 -0.61% 
World 4 077 291 3 952 025 -125 266 -3.07% -8 351 -0.20% 
Source: FAO, Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005 (http://www.fao.org/forestry/32033/en/) 
 
Table 2 - The importance of forestry in GDP, trade and fiscal revenues, 1998-2005 
Region Percentages of GDP Percentages of trade Percentages of fiscal 
revenues 
Asia 0.9 1.3  5.1 
Latin America & Caribbean 2.2 3.3  11.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.3 1.6  11.1 
Source: Authors’ calculation from FAO and WBI databases 
 
Table 2 shows that forest products generate non negligible revenues for Sub-Saharan 
African and Latin American countries. Moreover, recall that these figures are highly 
underestimating the real impact of forests, since it widely recognized that, because of missing 
markets and/or the public character of forest services, the economic importance of forests is 
understated particularly in developing countries (FAO, 1997).2 
Although they still fall short with respect to the weight of oil revenues (for example, oil 
taxes account in 2008 for about one half (Nigeria or Venezuela) and up to 75% (Angola) of 
Government receipts), deforestation revenues may still represent an important share of 
Government resources. For example, in Central and West African countries, where forests 
have been often granted to concessionaires since the colonial era, these revenues remain high. 
According to evidence from Karsenty (2007), forest taxes are about 18-19% (Cameroon and 
Gabon) and close to one third (Congo Republic) of Government resources. Finally, one 
should notice that in countries with a very important forest sector, their contribution to the 
                                                 
2
 The report by Saunders, Ebeling & Nussbaum (2008) estimates that in 1997 in Brazil only 40% of wood 
production was legal, and thus subjected to Government taxation. The authors also recall that, during the last 
decade, lost revenues from undeclared forest activity are as high as 15 billion US dollars per year. 
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Government budget may even overpass the one from other natural resources (for example, in 
Indonesia forest taxes represent 27% of fiscal revenues in 2008, six points more than oil 
taxes). 
In addition to forest resources, Governments of developing countries also build their 
revenues on seigniorage, which are the revenues generated by the newly issued money and 
measured (as usual) as the changes in the reserve money over GDP. If we consider averages 
over the 1970-2005 period, the weight of seigniorage is between 1 and 10% on regional 
averages of Government revenues (Table 3), but may climb up to one third or even one half, 
especially in Latin America countries (Argentina or Brazil, among others). These figures (see 
also Appendix C) support the fact that seigniorage may represent an important share of 
government revenues in developing countries, as previously acknowledged both empirically 
(e.g. Cukierman, Edwards & Tabellini, 1992) and theoretically (e.g. Minea & Villieu, 2009). 
Revenues generated by forests and money thus constitute an important source of government 
revenues in a number of emerging and developing countries, with limited ability to levy taxes 
and limited access to international debt markets. Furthermore, these revenues are probably the 
hardest forms of taxation to evade and their political cost may be lower than other forms of 
fiscal policy. It is also worth to notice that seigniorage revenues have decreased in the nineties 
as the result of disinflation policies promoted by the International Monetary Fund.   
Table 3 - The importance of seigniorage revenues in GDP, 1970-2005, in percentages 
Region 1970-2005 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1997 1998-2005 
Asia 1.4 (3.5) 1.3 (0.4) 1.4 (10.3) 1.6 (8.3) 1.1 (1.0) 
Latin America & Caribbean 10.6 (3.1) 2.1 (0.4) 27.1 (9.2) 13.2 (8.0) 0.6 (1.0) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.0 (2.4) 0.9 (0.3) 1.1 (6.9) 11.3 (5.8) 1.9 (0.7) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Given their importance as financing sources for Governments in developing countries, we 
try in this paper to evaluate the link between deforestation which can be more generally 
considered as a proxy for environment goals and seigniorage. This issue does not seem to 
have been much examined in the literature which has mainly focused on the indirect link 
between fiscal and monetary policies and environmental quality. Faria (1998) investigates 
whether fiscal and monetary policies have environmental effects, with a particular emphasis 
on the environmental impact of inflation. In his model, economic growth negatively affects 
the environment; if the anti-Tobin effect dominates, inflation may become “environmentally 
friendly”. Many other studies have analyzed the effect of structural adjustment programs on 
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the environment (i.e., Munasinghe, 1999; Strand and Mundaca, 2006), but with few 
references to the inflation-versus-environment trade-off. We examine the possible conflict 
between disinflation policies and natural resources depletion like deforestation. Therefore, we 
can wonder about a possible substitution effect between these two variables: disinflation 
policies could lead governments to search other fiscal resources on the form of increased 
taxes on the natural resource sector. Thus, inflation-fighting policies, such as recommended 
by stabilization and structural adjustment programs, could cause an over-depletion of natural 
resources with harmful consequences on environmental quality and possible international 
spillover effects.  
We first present a simple theoretical model built on this intuition (Section 1). Second the 
econometric on a panel of developing countries supports our theoretical conclusions, namely 
that lower seigniorage revenues lead to a higher deforestation rate (Section 2). This result is 
robust to different control variables, including an environmental Kuznets curve, different 
fiscal policy variables, population, mineral resources or prices (the exchange rate) or when 
accounting for the endogeneity between seigniorage and deforestation using instrumental 
variables. Third, a solution to the trade-off between disinflation and environment is searched 
(Section 3). An “optimal” contract, imposing some environmental rewards, could circumvent 
the problem of substitutability between the two objectives and constitute a possible solution 
so that inflation-fighting policies would no longer be detrimental to deforestation.  
1.  A theoretical model of substitution between forest and 
seigniorage revenues 
We consider a theoretical model based on Barro & Gordon (1983) setup. We suppose that 
the log of output y  positively depends on inflation surprises ( )epipi − , with pi  the inflation 
rate and epi  the anticipated inflation rate, and on the log of public spending g , with α  and β  
strictly positive weights: 
( ) gy e βpipiα +−=          (1) 
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We suppose the presence of a single Monetary and Fiscal Authority (to simplify, we 
denote this consolidated Authority by “Government”)3 that may finance public spending g  
by the means of revenues from natural resources f  and inflation pi  (seigniorage revenues).4 
In the following we assume that f  stands for revenues from deforestation, but our analysis 
would still hold if we consider other types of natural resources (for example, oil or mineral 
resources). We also introduce a parameter for the quality of institutions [ ]1;0∈φ , to capture 
the fact that better institutions improve the collection of forest revenues and reduce 
deforestation (at given g  and pi ): 
piφ += fg           (2) 
We consider that the Government maximizes the following welfare function: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ){ }222
2
1 fffL eg −+++−+−−= µpiφβpipiαλpipi    (3) 
According to (3), the Government’s welfare functions depends on three objectives. First, 
on inflation deviations with respect to its targeted value pi . Remark that, according to IMF’s 
classification, 31 out of the countries included in our sample of developing countries were 
having explicit or implicit monetary targets in 2006 (IMF, 2006). Second, the welfare 
function also depends on output deviations with respect to a targeted (long-term) value, which 
we normalize for simplicity to zero. 
Third, allowing for a deforestation goal in the welfare function is motivated by the increase 
of the importance of sustainable development in both people’s conscience and politics’ 
preoccupations (as stated in Introduction, see footnote 1). Therefore, in countries with an 
important forest, Government may well be interested in preserving the forest by imposing a 
“natural” rate of deforestation f  and penalizing any deviation from this rate. f  may be 
either settled by the Government, or be imposed by a supra authority. In both cases, we 
suppose that f  is settled optimally, as the sustainable depletion rate for an 
                                                 
3
 The presence of a single authority is compatible with the fact that seigniorage revenues are available at no 
transfer cost. 
4
 As mentioned in Introduction, we disregard taxes and public debt financing. One may also consider g  as the 
public spending that cannot be financed by tax and public debt revenues. 
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exhaustible/renewable resource.5 Strictly positive parameters λ  and µ  capture the relative 
weights of output and deforestation objectives in the Government welfare function. 
Since gL  is convex in its arguments, we find the optimal (that maximize gL ) inflation and 
deforestation values using the first order conditions (remark that, in the absence of stochastic 
shocks, epipi =  ex-post): 
:/pi  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0fpi pi λ α β β φ pi− + + + =       (4a) 
:/ f  ( ) ( ) 02 =−−+− fff µpiφλφβ       (4b) 
Using (4a) and (4b) we can see that inflation and deforestation are jointly determined in 
our model: 
( )
( )βαλβ
βαλβφpi
pi
++
+−
=
1
f
 and 22
2
φλβµ
φpiλβµ
+
−
=
ff      (5) 
Finally, defining ( )1A λβ α β≡ + + , the equilibrium optimal values for inflation and 
deforestation are: 
A
fAf
µβλφ
piλφβµ
+
−
= 22
2
*
         (6a) 
( ) ( )
A
f
µβλφ
βαλβφµµβλφpi
pi
+
+−+
= 22
22
*
      (6b) 
The following Proposition establishes the key results of our model. 
 
Proposition: 
a) a tighter monetary policy (a lower inflation target pi ) decreases the optimal 
inflation rate ( *pi ) but increases the deforestation rate ( *f ); 
b) a lower deforestation target f  decreases the deforestation rate (and increases the 
optimal increases the inflation rate); 
c) the quality of institutions φ  has a negative impact on the deforestation rate ( *f ). 
                                                 
5
 The question of the renewable/exhaustible character of equatorial and tropical forests is still an open question. 
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Proof: 
a) Using simple derivatives we find that a tighter monetary policy (i.e. a lower inflation 
target pi ) decreases as expected the optimal inflation rate ( 022
22*
>
+
+
=
Ad
d
µβλφ
µβλφ
pi
pi ), but 
increases the deforestation rate ( 022
2
<
+
−=
Ad
df
µβλφ
λφβ
pi
). Consequently, there exists a trade-
off between macroeconomic objectives (inflation) and environment objectives (deforestation): 
monetary policies that aim at reducing inflation are found to worsen the environment, by 
increasing the depletion rate of natural resources (for example, in our model, the deforestation 
rate). 
Our result may be used to analyze the effects engendered by the action of international 
institutions fighting inflation (for example, the IMF). Implementing policies that aim at 
lowering the inflation generates a resource loss, in the form of lower seigniorage revenues. 
Consequently, imposing low inflation rates may lead to a higher natural resources depletion 
rate (monetary revenues and natural resources revenues are substitutes). 
 
b) The deforestation target has opposite effects on the two objectives: imposing a lower 
deforestation target decreases the optimal deforestation rate ( 0
*
>= Afd
df µ ) and increases 
optimal inflation ( ( ) 022
*
<
+
+
−=
Afd
d
µβλφ
βαλβφµpi ). The raise in optimal inflation reflects the fact 
that more seigniorage revenues are needed to offset the reduction in deforestation resources. 
Typically, this is the case when forest protection organizations exert some form of pressure 
over domestic institutions to make them lower forest depletion. In this case the forest is better 
preserved, but seigniorage must raise. This result confirms the trade-off between 
environmental goals and macroeconomic stability. 
 
c) The quality of institutions has a negative impact on the deforestation rate: when the 
quality of institutions is higher, Authorities are able to collect a higher share of (given) 
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deforestation revenues. As a result, optimal deforestation rate may be decreased. 
Consequently, there exists a negative link between the quality of institutions and the 
deforestation rate ( 0
*
<φd
df ). 
Finally, remark that the substitution effect between monetary policy and environment goals 
holds when controlling for public spending. Assuming, as Alesina & Tabellini (1987), that 
Government targets a strictly positive public spending value g , the Government welfare 
function and equilibrium inflation and deforestation rate become (with 0=β  for simplicity): 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ){ }2222
2
1 ggffL eg −+−+−+−−= εµpipiαλpipi    (7) 
( )
2
* 1
εφµεµ
piεφεφµε
++
−++
=
gff         (8a) 
( )
2
2
*
εφµεµ
εφµεµpiεφµ
pi
++
−++
=
fg
       (8b) 
If the Government targets a higher amount of public spending g , both inflation and 
deforestation are higher in equilibrium. Previous results are unchanged, since a tighter 
monetary policy (a lower inflation target pi ) increases the equilibrium deforestation rate 
( *f ). 
The next section explores our theoretical conclusions by proposing an econometric 
analysis on a panel of developing countries with important forests. 
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2.  Empirical evidence of the existence of a substitution 
effect between deforestation and seigniorage 
According to our theoretical model, there exists a substitution effect between seigniorage 
and deforestation (and, more generally, natural resources depletion). This section tests this 
result on a panel of developing countries with important forests (at least 10% of forest area in 
total surface). This section includes the basic econometric specification, the data set and 
presents the econometric results.  
2.1 Basic econometric specification 
The panel data model with fixed effects is considered since the Hausman test rejects the 
null hypothesis of no correlation between specific effects and the regressors : 
it
K
k
itkkittiit xbeSeignioragbaaDefor ε++++= ∑
=1
;0      (9) 
itDefor  is the average deforestation rate, with subscript Ni ,1=  designating countries and 
subscript Tt ,1=  standing for the time period. ia  is the intercept term for country i , ta  stands 
for the fixed effect for period t  and itε  is an error term that is normally and independently 
distributed. ia ’s capture unobservable countries’ structural characteristics that are period 
invariant (for example, long term climatic and geographical characteristics), while ta ’s 
retrieve unobservable periods’ characteristics that are country invariant (for example, 
international price movements). Coefficient 0b  measures the marginal effect of seigniorage, 
while kb , Kk ,1=  are the coefficients to be estimated for the K  control variables. 
We consider several control variables kx , which are either assumed from the theoretical 
model or inferred from studies on the determinants of deforestation. Concerning the first 
group of control variables, our theoretical model predicts that better institutions may enhance 
the forest protection. Using two different databases, we select two measures for the quality of 
institutions, namely ratings from Economic Freedom of the World (Civil) or from the 
Freedom House (Fraser). Another feature of the theoretical model is that an increase in public 
spending is detrimental to the forest, since public spending enhance the need for additional 
resources (including seigniorage revenues). We reproduce this effect by using the ratio of 
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general government consumption to GDP (Gratioy).  The ratio of the total debt service to 
exports (DebtBurden) is also introduced following Kahn & McDonald (1995) who stress the 
significant positive association between public debt and deforestation in LDCs. These authors 
defend debt alleviations as a mean to reduce the pressure to deforest and suggest that “win-
win policies” like debt-for-nature swaps are feasible, in order to reduce both public debt and 
natural resources depletion.  
The second group of control variables is inspired by the adjacent literature on 
deforestation. First, we aim at reproducing the existence of an Environmental Kuznets Curve 
(EKC for deforestation), as emphasized by several recent contributions.6 To this end, we 
allow for a non linear influence of per-capita income (GDPPC) on deforestation, using a 
quadratic form through the term Squared GDPPC. Second, there is no clear-cut established 
effect of the population size on deforestation. On the one hand, it can reduce deforestation by 
enhancing the demand for forest products (Foster & Rosenzweig, 2003). On the other hand, 
population pressure may accelerate the conversion of forest into arable lands and may 
increase the demand for fuel wood (Cropper and Griffiths, 1994). We propose two measures 
of population, as either total population (Poptot) or as urban population in percentage of total 
population (Urbpop). Third, we wish to investigate if the negative impact of seigniorage on 
deforestation still holds when controlling for government revenues generated by other natural 
resources depletion, such as mineral depletion (Mineral) or fuel exports revenues (XFuel). 
Fourth, the real exchange rate (Reer) is introduced to control for the competitiveness of the 
export sector (we expect that a real appreciation preserves the forest, see Arcand et al., 2008). 
Finally, we test for an effect of economic growth (Growth) on deforestation.  
2.2 The data 
For each of the 74 countries to be potentially included in the sample (for the list of 
countries see Appendix B), four observations are available for the following periods: 1970-
1979 (period1), 1980-1989 (period2), 1990-1997 (period3) and 1998-2005 (period4). The use 
of period averages allows reducing short-term fluctuations. We define deforestation (Defor) 
as the average deforestation rate over the considered period. Concerning the seigniorage, we 
follow Aisen & Vega (2008) and define it as the revenue generated from the issuance of 
                                                 
6
 See, among others, Angelsen & Kaimowitz (2000), Koop & Tole (2001), Barbier (2004), Bhattarai & Hammig 
(2004) or Culas (2007). 
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reserve money: seigniorage captures the change in reserve money over GDP. Appendix 1 
reports data definitions and sources for the remaining variables. 
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2.3 Econometric results 
 
C1. The main results 
In equation [1] (Table 4 below) we measure the influence of seigniorage on deforestation 
while controlling for a set of six “basic” variables: three from the theoretical model (the 
quality of institutions and fiscal variables – public consumption and the debt burden, and 
three on the basis of other studies on the drivers of deforestation (the EKC, population size, 
and economic growth). 
Remark first that control variables are significant and have the expected sign. According to 
our theoretical model, better institutional quality lowers deforestation. This result is close to 
evidence from Bhattarai & Hammig (2004), who highlight a positive effect of an 
improvement in political institutions and governance, measured with indexes of political 
rights and/or civil liberty, for forest preservation. Concerning the other feature of our 
theoretical model, both public spending and the debt burden exert a positive effect on 
deforestation. Population shifts upwards the relationship between deforestation and income. 
As debated in the literature, economic growth has an ambiguous impact on deforestation, 
since it may either exacerbate it (when primarily driven by the agricultural sector which 
competes for forested lands) or slow down forest depletion (when economic growth mirrors 
structural changes in the economy taking place in the manufactured or services sectors). The 
negative significant coefficient of variable Growth suggests the latter correlation. 
Finally and most important, when accounting for all these control variables, we may 
clearly isolate a negative and significant link between seigniorage and deforestation in 
regression [1], in line with our theoretical conclusions. 
However, an immediate critique for the quality of our results concerns the assumption of 
orthogonality between seigniorage and deforestation. Indeed, this assumption may be violated 
on two grounds. First, the seigniorage variable may be measured with an error (the attenuation 
bias). Second, one may question the absence of endogeneity between seigniorage and 
deforestation presumed in regression [1]; or to put it differently, regression [1] might 
reproduce an effect from equation (5) (namely pi∂∂ /f ), while we rather aim at testing an 
effect from equation (6a) (namely pi∂∂ /f ). To deal with these problems, we draw on the 
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Instrumental Variables (IV) technique and the panel two stage least squares (PTSLS) 
estimation method. 7 
We split IV into two groups. First, we use the lagged seigniorage Seigniorage(-1) under the 
hypotheses that seigniorage encompasses some inertia and that unobservable determinants of 
deforestation are independent over long lasting periods. In the second group we include 
ratings of Central Banks (CB) independence (CBIndep and CBturnover, see Appendix 1 for 
their definition), which obviously have no direct influence on deforestation and decrease 
seigniorage. 
Thus, contrary to regression [1] estimated by the PLS (Panel Least Squares) technique, the 
remaining regressions in Table 4 (regression [2]-[5]) are estimated using the PTSLS method. 
                                                 
7
 To put it differently, equation [1] measures pi∂∂ /f . However, we want to measure pi∂∂ /f , that we can 
write as 
pi
pi
pi ∂
∂
∂
∂f
. The use of instruments (first stage) allows measuring pipi ∂∂ /  and plugging this into the 
second stage (equations [2]-[5]) yields the elasticity pi∂∂ /f . 
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Table 4 - Estimation results (regressions [1]-[5]) 
Dependent variable: Defor 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Seigniorage  -0.006 
(-1.966)*** 
 
-0.010 
(-1.825)** 
-0.008 
(-2.628)**** 
-0.012 
(-2.000)*** 
-0.033 
(-4.941)**** 
Institutions Fraser -0.001 
(-2.012)*** 
 
-0.001 
(-2.194)*** 
-5.2E-4 
(-1.105) 
-8.9E-4 
(-2.929)*** 
-0.004 
(-3.934)**** 
Gratioy  0.015 
(1.798)** 
 
0.019 
(1.842)** 
0.021 
(1.824)** 
0.025 
(1.851)** 
0.049 
(4.047)**** 
DebtBurden  0.010 
(3.198)**** 
 
0.010 
(3.532)**** 
0.005 
(9.491)**** 
0.009 
(6.902)**** 
0.008 
(2.453)*** 
Log(Poptot)  0.016 
(1.624)** 
 
0.018 
(1.844)** 
0.028 
(1.945)** 
0.028 
(1.811)** 
0.024 
(2.268)*** 
Log(Gdppc)  0.003 
(0.635) 
 
0.017 
(1.405) 
0.033 
(2.522)*** 
0.024 
(1.599)* 
-4.0E-4 
(-0.030) 
Log(Gdppc) 
squared 
 -0.001 
(-2.134)*** 
 
-0.001 
(-1.943)*** 
-0.002 
(-2.805)**** 
-0.002 
(-1.985)*** 
-1.8E-4 
(-0.178) 
Growth  -2.3E-4 
(-2.746)**** 
 
-2.8E-4 
(-2.933)**** 
-3.4E-4 
(-2.389)*** 
-2.7E-4 
(-2.481)*** 
-3.6E-4 
(-3.540)**** 
Method of 
estimation 
 PLS PTSLS PTSLS PTSLS PTSLS 
Adj R2  0.42 0.44 0.45 0.50 0.27 
Nb of obs  130 125 89 111 122 
PLS: Panel Least Squares with countries and periods fixed effects; PTSLS: Panel Two-Stage Least Squares with 
countries and periods fixed effects. First stage identifying instruments are reported in Table 5. t -statistics in 
parentheses are robust to cross-section heteroskedasticity in the disturbances. **** significant at the 1% level; *** 
significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 10% level; * significant at the 15% level 
Table 5 below depicts the results of the first stage equations that allow computing the 
exogenous (not correlated to deforestation) part of seigniorage using different combinations 
of instruments. 
Table 5 - First stage regressions (regressions [2]-[5]) 
Dependent variable : Seigniorage 
First stage equations [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Seigniorage(-1) 0.332 
(7.120)**** 
 
0.223 
(2.642)*** 
0.307 
(6.426)**** 
 
CBturnover  0.304 
(4.814)**** 
 
0.207 
(4.739)**** 
0.200 
(6.640)**** 
CBindep  -0.287 
(4.715)**** 
 
  
Adj R2 0.726 0.815 0.749 0.631 
PLS estimations with robust t reported in brackets. Exogenous control variables coefficients and t statistics are 
not reproduced. **** significant at the 1% level; *** significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 10% level; * 
significant at the 15% level  
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Table 6 below details results by proposing several tests of the quality of the adjustment of 
regressions in the first stage. The over-identification Sargan test (Sargan, 1988) checks the 
exogeneity of the instruments, while the partial Shea-Godfrey 2R  (Godfrey, 1999) and the F  
test of excluded instruments (Stock, Wright & Yogo, 2002) provide information that allows 
detecting weak instruments. 
Table 6 - Restriction tests (regressions [1]-[5]) 
Dependent variable : Seigniorage 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Instruments List   I II III IV 
Sargan Test p-Value   0.971 
 
0.999  
First stage: 
Shea-Godfrey 
statistic 
Partial R2  0.342 0.892 0.245 0.299 
First stage: 
Stock-Yogo 
statistic 
Partial F  30.015 8.892 14.372 2.818 
Instruments. List I: seigniorage(-1); List II: seigniorage(-1), CBindep, CBturnover; List III: seigniorage(-1), 
CBturnover; List IV: CBturnover. 
These tests support our instrumentation strategy and the pertinence of the instruments. 
According to Stock, Wright & Yogo (2002, p.522) at least PTSLS regressions [2] and [4] are 
reliable, since the first stage F  statistics are sufficiently large with respect to their criterion, 
namely superior to 10. Nevertheless, in all cases, the partial 2R , which measures the 
instrument relevance, is satisfactory. Moreover, the Sargan test does not reject the null 
hypothesis of the over-identification restrictions. 
Regressions [2]-[5] in Table 5 present our main estimation results (or the second stage of 
the PTSLS). With respect to equation [1], accounting for the endogeneity between seigniorage 
and deforestation has no effect on the significance or the sign of the control variables (in 
particular, results concerning EKC are improved). However, what is more important is that 
the coefficient of the variable Seigniorage measures this time the impact of the monetary 
policy variables on deforestation (namely pi∂∂ /f ). Remark first that the “exogenous” part of 
seigniorage still has a negative and significant impact on the deforestation, thus the two 
resources are substitutes, as in our theoretical model. Second, the absolute value of the 
seigniorage coefficient is higher, i.e. the substitution effect between seigniorage and 
deforestation is enforced when focusing on the exogenous component of seigniorage.8 
                                                 
8
 Hence, the PLS estimation of the seigniorage coefficient is biased towards 0 for two reasons: the attenuation 
bias and the positive correlation between seigniorage and the unobserved determinants of deforestation, i.e. a 
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C2. Robustness tests 
The purpose of this sub-section is to explore the robustness of our main results in different 
directions. The estimation results for the robustness equations [6]-[12] are detailed in Table 7, 
while Table 8 presents the corresponding instruments relevance tests (all equations are 
estimated using the PSTLS technique) and Table 8 weak instruments tests. We split our 
robustness tests in two groups. 
Group 1: different measures for control variables and subsequent control variables 
First, beside total population (Poptot), we introduce a second measure, namely urban 
population relative to total population (Urbpop). Results in regressions [6]-[8] and [10]-[12] 
support that urban population has a positive and significant influence on deforestation, as 
expected. Second, replacing the institutional quality variable (Fraser) used in regressions [1]-
[7] and [9] with an alternative measure (Civil) does not change results in regression [8]: better 
institutions still allow preserving the forest. 
Third, we introduce in equation [9] two variables accounting for other natural resources 
depletion. Both mineral depletion (Mineral) and fuel exports (Xfuel) have a negative and 
significant impact on deforestation, thus reproducing a substitution effect between forest 
revenues and other natural resources revenues.9 Finally, the initial forest area does not seem to 
have a significant effect on deforestation (according to regression [7]); thus, our econometric 
results invalidate the existence of a convergence effect of forests towards a long-term level. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
country facing institutional, political or economic failures will draw on seigniorage revenues and poorly manage 
its natural resources as well. 
9
 To put it differently, since these natural resources are traded-off with the forest, their use is expected to protect 
the forest. This is not to be interpreted as an incentive to extract more minerals and fuels, but, on the contrary, as 
a future negative effect on the forest area as soon as these resources will become scarce/expensive. 
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Table 7 - Estimations Results (regressions [6]-[12]) 
Dependent variable: Defor 
 [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
Seigniorage 
Level 
-0.011 
(-2.010)*** 
 
-0.011 
(-2.049)*** 
-0.009 
(-1.780)** 
-0.028 
(-2.625)**** 
-0.028 
(-2.576)**** 
-0.010 
(-2.096)*** 
-0.009 
(-2.170)*** 
Squared      0.004 
(3.409)**** 
 
 
Institutions 
Fraser 
-8.7E-4 
(-2.164)*** 
 
-7.7E-4 
(2.725)**** 
 -0.003 
(-3.021)**** 
-0.003 
(-2.441)**** 
 -7.7E-4 
(-1.782)** 
Civil   -0.001 
(-1.752)** 
  -9.0E-4 
(-1.070) 
 
Gratioy 0.023 
(1.832)** 
 
0.024 
(1.857)** 
0.024 
(1.629)* 
0.063 
(2.633)**** 
0.065 
(2.806)**** 
0.011 
(1.190) 
0.030 
(2.177)*** 
DebtBurden 0.008 
(5.046)**** 
 
0.008 
(5.528)**** 
0.005 
(2.258)*** 
0.011 
(2.865)**** 
0.009 
(2.858)*** 
0.007 
(12.199)**** 
0.007 
(3.140)**** 
Log(Poptot) 0.023 
(1.786)** 
 
0.024 
(1.807)** 
0.029 
(1.687)** 
0.034 
(1.790)** 
0.027 
(1.697)** 
0.023 
(1.289) 
0.016 
(1.318) 
Urbpop 0.021 
(2.787)**** 
 
0.021 
(2.805)**** 
0.028 
(2.545)*** 
 0.030 
(1.151) 
0.017 
(8.131)**** 
0.020 
(4.116)**** 
Log(Gdppc) 0.030 
(1.533)* 
 
0.029 
(1.517)* 
0.044 
(2.668)*** 
0.042 
(3.171)**** 
0.042 
(2.351)*** 
0.012 
(1.686)** 
0.025 
(1.557)**** 
Log(Gdppc) 
squared 
-0.002 
(-1.860)** 
 
-0.002 
(-1.844)** 
-0.003 
(-2.790)**** 
-0.003 
(-4.578)**** 
-0.003 
(-3.047)**** 
-0.001 
(-2.585)*** 
-0.002 
(-1.931)**** 
Growth -2.2E-4 
(-1.853)** 
 
-2.4E-4 
(-2.739)**** 
-3.3E-4 
(-2.020)*** 
-2.3E-4 
(-3.643)**** 
-2.2E-4 
(-2.061)*** 
-1.9E-4 
(-3.226)**** 
-1.5E-4 
(-1.796)** 
Log(foret0  8.8E-4 
(0.505) 
     
XFuel    -0.019 
(-2.931)**** 
 
-0.017 
(-2.717)**** 
  
Mineral    -0.086 
(-6.648)**** 
 
-0.108 
(-5.322)**** 
  
Reer     -2.0E-5 
(-2.948)**** 
 
 -2.3E-5 
(-5.456)**** 
Reerins       7.5E-5 
(1.342) 
Aidgni       -0.025 
(-2.684)**** 
Method of 
estimation 
PTSLS PTSLS PTSLS PTSLS PTSLS PTSLS PTSLS 
Adj R2 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.51 
Nb of obs 111 111 89 103 103 121 110 
PLS: Panel Least Squares with countries and periods fixed effects; PTSLS: Panel Two-Stage Least Squares with 
countries and periods fixed effects. First stage identifying instruments are reported in Table 7. t  statistics in 
brackets are robust to cross-section heteroskedasticity in the disturbances. **** significant at the 1% level; *** 
significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 10% level; * significant at the 15% level. 
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Table 8 - Restriction tests (regressions [6]-[12]) 
Dependent variable : Seigniorage 
 [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
Instruments 
List 
III III II III III V III 
Sargan Test        
p-value 0.997 
 
0.998 0.964 0.998 0.999 0.955 0.967 
First stage: 
Shea-Godfrey 
statistic 
       
Partial R2 0.287 0.292 0.383 0.416 0.351 Seigniorage: 
0.171 
Seigniorage 
squared: 0.302 
 
0.612 
First stage: 
Stock-Yogo 
statistic 
       
Partial F 14.410 14.191 9.632 8.368 8.546 43.917(a) 13.160 
Instruments. List II: seigniorage(-1), CBindep, CBturnover; List III: seigniorage(-1), CBturnover; List V: 
seigniorage(-1), CBturnover, seigniorage(-1)squared, CBturnover squared. 
(a) computed on the predicted non linear combination of seigniorage from the PTSLS estimation 
In line with previous findings (Arcand et al., 2008) a real appreciation of the local currency 
(an increase in REER) reduces deforestation. The intuition is that it slows down land clearing 
for the agricultural export sector expansion and penalizes the profitability of logging activities 
for export. One could suspect that the seigniorage is correlated with a real appreciation; 
however, the introduction of this variable does not modify the marginal impact of the 
seigniorage variable (equation [10] in Table 7).10 Hence, the variable Seigniorage really 
catches a substitution effect in the government financing, independently of an eventual 
modification in non-tradable versus tradable goods prices.  
At last, we show that our results still hold if we control by the aid (Aidgni) or by the 
instability of the real exchange rate (in particular, the aid has a negative and significant effect 
on deforestation) in equation [12] in Table 7). It is indeed assumed that aid flows may 
dampen the pressure on natural resources depletion and more specifically be designated to 
finance the incremental costs of global public goods in developing countries as suggested by 
Kaul and al. 2003. The instability of the real exchange rate (Reerins) helps capture a 
characteristic of developing countries that often exhibit macroeconomic instability: Reerins as 
a negative sign in equation [12] as expected but is weakly significant. 
                                                 
10
 Note that Reer is computed without taking into account oil exporters in the calculation of the weighting of the 
main trade partners. Introducing oil exporters does not change the results. 
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Group 2: Non linear effects of seigniorage on deforestation  
Next, we explore the existence of a nonlinear effect of seigniorage on deforestation. To put 
it differently, it would be interesting to search for the existence of seigniorage level 
above/below which seigniorage and deforestation would be complements. 
We allow in regression [11 for a quadratic form of seigniorage. This simple form to 
account for non linearities yields significant U-curves. Consequently, seigniorage and forest 
are still substitutes below the threshold (about 125% seigniorage ratio) and complements 
above this value. This finding deserves several remarks. First, the absence of a trade-off 
between seigniorage and forest at such high levels of seigniorage (above the threshold) may 
reflect a poor management of macroeconomic and/or environmental policies). Second, there 
exists a very limited set of pairs of periods-countries that are concerned with this 
phenomenon. Third, and most important, the trade-off between seigniorage and forest 
revenues appears very robust at low levels of seigniorage (in particular, it still holds when 
considering non linearities). Since monetary policy recommendations for developing 
countries are precisely targeting these low levels of seigniorage, they would probably lead, in 
the light of our theoretical model and econometric evidence, to a deterioration of the forest 
surface. 
To summarize, irrespective of control variables and their measure or of the different 
instruments used for the first stage regressions, seigniorage has always a negative and 
significant effect on deforestation, as emphasized in our theoretical model. Consequently, it 
would be interesting to propose an estimation of the magnitude of this negative effect. On the 
basis of regression [4], a 10% increase in seigniorage reduces the average deforestation rates 
by 1.4% (and the reduction in deforestation may climb up to 3.9% if we consider regression 
[5]). This result confirms that there exist a non-negligible trade-off between macroeconomic 
goals and environmental objectives. 
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3.  Protecting the forest in low-inflation developing 
countries: a solution 
According to our model, supported by empirical evidence, there exists a non-negligible 
substitution effect between seigniorage revenues and deforestation revenues in developing 
countries. As a consequence, countries that launch into inflation stabilization programs may 
experience an increase in their deforestation rate. The purpose of this section is to try to 
develop a solution to this problem. We focus on an international mechanism which is justified 
by the fact that forest generates international spillovers. For instance forests are the second 
biggest stock of carbon on earth after oceans, therefore contributing to mitigate climate 
change. They provide a habitat for between 50 and 90 per cent of the total biodiversity of the 
planet. Deforestation and forest degradation are among the most important sources of 
emissions of greenhouse gases, just behind the energy sector, contributing about 20 per cent 
of the overall greenhouse gases entering the atmosphere (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, IPCC), and forest clearance is responsible for the extinction of many species. 
Consequently, the preservation of equatorial and tropical forests is now a global issue on the 
agenda of international environmental negotiations, especially the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
Thus, deforestation is a direct clause of concern for “international agencies” who might 
attempt to implement a transfer scheme for “avoided deforestation” (such as the United 
Nations program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation-REDD),11 all 
the more that deforestation and forest degradation are taking place at an extremely rapid pace. 
The optimal contract can be viewed as a win-win strategy: effectively, under the optimal 
contract, a lower inflation target does not encourage governments to resort to resource 
depletion, and might even reduce the depletion of natural resources. Thus, the model may 
justify the intervention of an international agency, who implements a transfer scheme in order 
to limit deforestation, with optimal rewards/penalties being contingent to the current inflation 
target.  
                                                 
11
 In December 2005, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change developed an agenda item 
on “Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries and approaches to stimulate action”. The 
REDD Program is aimed at generating transfer flows of resources to reduce global emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation. The REDD scheme currently under examination, as defined by the 2007 Bali meeting of 
the UNFCCC, proposes that developed countries pay developing countries for CO2 emissions saved through 
avoided deforestation. A multi-donor trust fund was established in July 2008 that allows donors to pool 
resources and provides funding to activities towards this Program. 
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One way to avoid that a tighter monetary policy (a lower pi ) decreases optimal 
deforestation ( *f ) is to consider the presence of a Supra-Authority (Principal) that aims at 
protecting the forest. To achieve this goal, the Principal transfers to Government 0>ω  units 
of revenue per each unit of deforestation below a target f~ , namely ( )ff −~ω .12 
Consequently, the Government maximizes the following welfare function: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ){ } ( )fffffL eg −+−+++−+−−= ~
2
1 222 ωµpiφβpipiαλpipi   (10) 
Since gL  is still convex in its arguments, we find the optimal inflation and deforestation 
values using the first order conditions (recall that, in the absence of stochastic shocks, epipi =  
ex-post): 
:/pi  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0fpi pi λ α β β φ pi− + + + =       (11a) 
:/ f  ( ) ( ) 02 =−−−+− ωµpiφλφβ fff       (11b) 
From (11a-b), we easily derive the equilibrium values, with ( ) 01 >++≡ βαλβA : 
( )
A
AfAf
µβλφ
ωpiλφβµ
ω
+
−−
= 22
2
*
        (12a) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
A
f
µβλφ
ωβαλβφβαλβφµµβλφpi
ωpi
+
+++−+
= 22
22
*
    (12b) 
Remark that pi−  and ω  exert opposite effects on the optimal deforestation rate *f  in 
(12a). Following the adoption of a tighter monetary policy ( 0<pid ), we can compute the 
change in ω  that keeps forest constant ( 0* =df ) by writing the total differential of 
( )ωpi ;** ff ≡ : 
( ) ( )piβαλβ
φλβ
ω
ω
pi
pi
ω ddf
f
d
d
df
−
++
=⇔
∂∂
∂∂
−=
=
1/
/ 2
*
*
0*
    (13) 
                                                 
12
 Our results are unchanged if we define the transfer as ( )ff ~/1−ω , and in this case optimal deforestation 
( *f ) would positively depend on the Principal’s deforestation target ( f~ ), i.e. a tighter deforestation target 
reduces optimal deforestation. Moreover, we suppose that ff <~ , since Principal’s interest for protecting the 
forest is more important with respect to Government (but results still hold for any f~  value, including ff ≥~ ). 
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First, observe that the subsidy is rising when the monetary policy is more restrictive 
( 0<pid ). Allowing for a sufficiently high increase in ω  prevents deforestation from raising; 
in this case, lower inflation and forest protection are no longer conflicting goals. Second, the 
magnitude of the subsidy depends positively on the quality of institutions φ . Since the quality 
of institutions is relatively low in developing countries, our result exhibits an interesting 
incentive to put in place such a subsidy system in order to protect forests, because of a 
potentially relatively reduced cost. Finally, the size of the subsidy ( ωd ) must be more 
important as the stabilization program ( )pid  is more aggressive. 
With respect to these findings, let us highlight two points. On the one hand, remark that we 
have implicitly assumed that Principal chooses to increase ω  to prevent deforestation 
( 0* ≤df ), by setting the appropriate magnitude (namely piω dd /  that prevents an increase in 
forest depletion). On the other hand, the mere purpose of this transfer is to prevent 
deforestation. However, one may argue that ω  should be chosen optimally, as the transfer 
that maximizes Principal’s welfare, which is defined as:13 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( ){ }2*2**2* ~
2
1 fffW −+++−= ωµωpiωφβλωpi     (14) 
Compared to Government, the Principal targets a zero inflation rate (results are 
unchanged for a non-zero target pipi <~ ), has perfect expectations ( epipi =  ex-ante) and pursue 
a different forest target ff <~  (results are unchanged for any value of f~ ). To maximize 
welfare W , the Principal internalizes Government’s optimal inflation and deforestation values 
( )ωpi *  and ( )ω*f  from (12a-b), and chooses the optimal transfer *ω , defined as 
0
*
=
=ωωωd
dW
: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( ) 010
~
22
222
22222
*
>++≡>+≡
++
++−++−
=
βαλβφλβµ
βαφβαλ
piφλβµαβλβφβαµφβαλµ
ω
AandABwith
AB
BfffAB
  (15) 
                                                 
13
 An alternative solution is to compute the optimal deforestation target for the Principal, namely *
~f , with no 
subsidy ( 0=ω ) and the term ( )fff ~−−µ  in the Government’s welfare function (10). Using ω  or f~  as an 
instrument might be easier to implement compared to a program in which the Principal chooses the quality of 
institutions φ , since changing institutions is more difficult than proposing a supra-national subvention/penalty 
program (as, for example, the pollution quotas established by the Kyoto Protocol). 
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Observe in (15) that, in order to maximize welfare, the Principal must increase the 
optimal transfer *ω  following the adoption of a tighter monetary policy (a lower pi ). 
We may now compute the effect of pi  on the optimal deforestation as: 
( )( ) ( )
( ) 0
1;
222
*
2
**
>
++
=





−−=
ABd
dA
Bd
df
βαφβαλ
αλβφ
pi
piωφλβ
pi
piωpi
  (16) 
 Contrary to the case 0=ω , where a tighter monetary target was increasing optimal 
deforestation (see relation (6a)), a lower inflation target 0<pid  is decreasing optimal 
deforestation in (16), namely 0* <df . Consequently, subsidizing forest protection upturns the 
positive correlation between a tighter monetary policy and deforestation. Moreover, the 
transfer that allows for inflation and deforestation objectives not to be contradictory can be 
defined as part of an optimal scheme, in which the Principal sets the transfer in order to 
maximize welfare. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper is one of the first attempts to bridge a gap between two aspects of economic 
policies in developing countries that are usually considered in isolation: natural resources 
depletion and monetary policies. Indeed, including environmental objectives in Governments’ 
preoccupations and considering the potential impact of macroeconomic objectives on the 
environment may provide a way to impede the deforestation process that affected developing 
countries in the last decades. 
In developing countries with an important forest area, forest revenues and seigniorage are 
two important resources for Government revenues. Building on this idea, we propose a simple 
theoretical model showing that Governments may trade off revenues generated by forest 
depletion with revenues generated by seigniorage. The evidence proposed by our econometric 
analysis, performed on a sample of developing countries with important forest, corroborates 
the existence of an arbitrage between forest conversion and seigniorage revenues.  
Consequently, our paper asserts that, in the absence of some compensating revenues, there 
exists a trade-off between macroeconomic performances (inflation) and the environment 
(deforestation policies). One should of course be cautious in concluding that macroeconomic 
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policies are the main drivers of deforestation; our results only suggest that, in some 
developing countries, the conversion of forests that are often state-owned may generate 
important revenues to public budgets. Hence, the efficiency of usual environmental policies 
aimed at promoting sustainable forest management may be reduced in the presence of 
macroeconomic objectives such as downsizing seigniorage revenues. 
Furthermore, our findings shed a different light on macroeconomic policies that restrict 
seigniorage revenues by fighting inflation (such as, for example, IMF’s recommendations for 
tighten monetary policies, including inflation targeting or exchange rate control). Failing to 
provide for some compensating revenues may lead Governments to accept a higher 
deforestation rate in countries where revenues from forests are important and, more generally, 
in countries where revenues from natural resources depletion are significant. This is 
particularly supported by a recent survey by López (2006, in López & Toman, p. 157), who 
recalls that countries under structural adjustments programs under-invest in their human and 
environmental assets. 
Consequently, our conclusions support the recent debate on the necessity of some form of 
rewarding for countries combating climate change by reducing deforestation and forest 
degradation with the United Nations Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD) (e.g. Combes-Motel, Combes & Pirard, 
2009). Subsidizing countries that limit deforestation or developing countries that launch into 
macroeconomic stabilization policies (by fighting inflation, for example), may be a virtuous 
way to prevent forest depletion. 
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Appendix 1: Variables’ description and definition 
Variables Description Source 
Dependent variable:   
Defor Average annual deforestation rate, % FAOstat 
Explanatory variables:   
Interest variables   
Seigniorage Seigniorage1: Change in reserve money 
∆M over GDP. 
∆M in current LCU, IFS line 14a 
GDP in current LCU, World Development Indicators 2008 
Control variables   
Log(Forest0 Initial forest area FAO stat 
Log(GDPPC and 
log(GDPPC squared  
GDP per capita, constant 2000 USD World Development Indicators 2008 
Fraser 
 
 
Civil 
Area 5, regulation of credit, labor, 
business. An increase means an 
improvement. 
Civil liberty index. An increase means 
an improvement. 
The Fraser Institute 
 
 
The Freedom house 
Poptot 
Urbpop 
Population, total 
Urban population, percentage of total 
World Development Indicators 2008 
World Development Indicators 2008 
Growth GDP per capita  growth, annual % World Development Indicators 2008 
Gratioy 
 
DebtBurden 
 
Government consumption, in % of 
GDP 
Total debt service, in percentage of 
export of goods, services and income 
Government consumption in current LCU, IFS line91; GDP in current LCU, World Development 
Indicators 2008 
World Development Indicators 2008 
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Xfuel Fuel exports in percentage of 
merchandise exports 
World Development Indicators 2008 
Mineral Mineral depletion in percentage of 
Gross National Income. Mineral 
depletion is equal to the product of unit 
resource rents and the physical 
quantities of minerals extracted 
(bauxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel, 
phosphate, tin, zinc, gold, and silver  
World Development Indicators 2008 
Reer Real effective exchange rate, base 100 
in 1990. Weights determined by the 
country’s first ten partners (imports and 
exports), oil countries excluded or not. 
An increase means a real appreciation.  
Authors’ calculations 
Aidgni Aid flows in percentages of gross 
national income 
World Development Indicators 2008 
Reerins Instability of Reer Authors’ calculations 
Instruments   
CBturnover Turnover of the Central Bank 
governors. An increase means a 
deterioration of CB governance 
Crowe and Meade (2007). The original variable is available on 1980-1989 and 1995-2004. It is assumed 
that the 1980-1989 ratings pertain in period1 and period2; the 1995-2004 ratings pertain in period3 and 
period4. Moreover since no ratings were reported in African monetary unions, it is assumed that there 
was no temporal variability for these countries   
CBindep Cukierman index of Central Bank 
independence. An increase means an 
improvement of CB independance 
Polillo and Guillén (2005). The original variable is available in 1989, 1995 and 2000. The 1989 ratings 
pertain in period1 and 2; the 1995 rating in period3; the 2000 rating in period4. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDICES (FOR REFEREES ONLY; NOT TO BE PUBLISHED) 
 
Appendix A: Extent of and change in forested areas by geographic areas, 1990-2005 
Areas Annual Change rate 
1990 2000 2005 1990-2000 2000-2005 
 
 
 
 
Regions  
1000 ha 1000 ha 1000 ha % of 
land area 
% of 
world 
forests 
1000 
ha/yr 
% 1000 
ha/yr 
% 
Total Eastern and 
Southern Africa  
252 354 235 047 226 534 28  -1 731 -0,71% -1 702 -0,74% 
Total Northern 
Africa  
146 093 135 958 131 048 9  -1 013 -0,72% -982 -0,74% 
Total Western and 
Central Africa  
300 914 284 608 277 829 44  -1 631 -0,56% -1 356 -0,48% 
Total Africa  699 361 655 613 635 412 21,0% 16,1% -4 375 -0,65% -4 040 -0,63% 
          
Total East Asia  208 155 225 663 244 862 21  1 751 0,81% 3 840 1,63% 
Total South and 
South-east Asia  
323 156 297 380 283 127 33  -2 578 -0,83% -2 851 -0,98% 
Total Western and 
Central Asia 
43 176 43 519 43 588 4  34 0,08% 14 0,03% 
Total Asia  574 487 566 562 571 577 18,0% 14,5% -792 -0,14% 1 003 0,18% 
    
 
     
Total Europe  989 320 998 091 1 001 394 43,6% 25,3% 877 0,09% 661 0,07% 
          
Total North 
America  
677 801 677 971 677 464 30,8% 17,1% 17 0,00% -101 -0,01% 
          
Total Caribbean 5 350 5 706 5 974   36 0,64% 54 0,92% 
Total Central 
America  
27 639 23 837 22 411   -380 -1,48% -285 -1,23% 
Total South 
America 
890 818 852 796 831 540   -3 802 -0,44% -4 251 -0,50% 
Total Carribean, 
Central and South 
America 
923 807 882 339 859 925 46,2% 21,8% -4 146 
 
-0,45% 
 
-4 482 
 
-0,51% 
 
          
Total Oceania  212 514 208 034 206 254 24,1% 5,2% -448 -0,21% -356 -0,17% 
          
Total World  4 077 291 3 988 610 3 952 025 29,5% 100% -8 868 -0,22% -7 317 -0,18% 
Source: FAO, Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005, available on line: http://www.fao.org/forestry/32033/en/ 
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Appendix B: List of Countries 
Country 
Code 
Country name  Country 
Code 
Country name  Country 
Code 
Country name 
AGO Angola  GIN Guinea  NER Niger 
ARG Argentina  GMB Gambia, The  NGA Nigeria 
BDI Burundi  GNB Guinea-Bissau  NIC Nicaragua 
BEN Benin  GNQ Equatorial Guinea  NPL Nepal 
BFA Burkina Faso  GTM Guatemala  PAK Pakistan 
BGD Bangladesh  GUY Guyana  PAN Panama 
BLZ Belize  HND Honduras  PER Peru 
BOL Bolivia  IDN Indonesia  PHL Philippines 
BRA Brazil  IND India  PNG Papua New Guinea 
BTN Bhutan  KEN Kenya  PRY Paraguay 
BWA Botswana  KHM Cambodia  SDN Sudan 
CAF Central African Republic  KOR Korea, Rep.  SEN Senegal 
CHL Chile  LAO Lao PDR  SLE Sierra Leone 
CHN China  LBR Liberia  SLV El Salvador 
CIV Cote d'Ivoire  LKA Sri Lanka  SUR Suriname 
CMR Cameroon  MDG Madagascar  TCD Chad 
COG Congo, Rep.  MEX Mexico  TGO Togo 
COL Colombia  MLI Mali  THA Thailand 
CRI Costa Rica  MNG Mongolia  TZA Tanzania 
ECU Ecuador  MOZ Mozambique  UGA Uganda 
ERI Eritrea  MRT Mauritania  URY Uruguay 
ETH Ethiopia  MWI Malawi  VEN Venezuela, RB 
GAB Gabon  MYS Malaysia  VNM Vietnam 
GHA Ghana  NAM Namibia  ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. 
      ZMB Zambia 
      ZWE Zimbabwe 
Note: The selected countries meet two conditions: being a developing and /or emerging country and having a 
forest area representing at least 10% of their total surface in period 1. 
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Appendix C: GDP per capita, average deforestation rates and seigniorage across countries and 
four periods 
 
 
70-79 80-89 90-97 98-05   70-79 80-89 90-97 98-05 
AGO GDPPC  Na 810 629 725  CMR 574 854 616 651 
 Seigniorage Na Na 153,3% 6,7%   0,9% 0,5% 0,0% 0,2% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,1%   0,0% 0,0% 0,4% 0,4% 
ARG GDPPC  6979 6613 7000 7499  COG 811 1230 1078 1027 
 Seigniorage 6,7% 26,3% 9,0% 1,1%   1,1% 0,7% 0,6% 0,8% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 0,2% 0,2%   0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
BDI GDPPC  130 145 135 106  COL 1391 1669 1999 2064 
 Seigniorage 1,1% 0,5% 0,8% 1,0%   1,5% 1,0% 1,0% 0,8% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 1,5% 2,2%   0,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
BEN GDPPC  285 296 280 315  CRI 2827 2916 3425 4140 
 Seigniorage 0,7% 0,7% 0,8% 1,0%   1,1% 1,4% 0,9% 0,3% 
 Defor 0,6% 0,6% 0,9% 1,1%   1,5% 0,8% 0,3% 0,1% 
BFA GDPPC  152 174 186 231  ECU 1154 1304 1331 1402 
 Seigniorage 0,6% 0,6% 1,4% -0,2%   1,1% -0,2% 0,3% -0,4% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,2%   0,2% 0,0% 0,7% 0,7% 
BGD GDPPC  227 242 281 355  ERI na na 180 183 
 Seigniorage 0,5% 0,4% 0,5% 0,6%   na na 6,5% 5,2% 
 Defor 0,1% 0,7% 0,0% 0,1%   na na na 0,1% 
BLZ GDPPC  1487 1939 2840 3398  ETH na 121 110 123 
 Seigniorage 0,8% 0,5% 0,3% 0,4%   na 0,8% 1,3% 0,8% 
 Defor -3,4% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%   na na 1,1% 0,5% 
BOL GDPPC  1054 917 924 1021  GAB 5336 4943 4717 4373 
 Seigniorage 1,8% 115,9% 0,8% 0,7%   1,3% 0,3% 0,4% 0,2% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 0,2% 0,2%   0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
BRA GDPPC  2774 3404 3482 3744  GHA 259 201 222 257 
 Seigniorage 1,3% 8,5% 27,8% 0,4%   0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
 Defor 0,2% -0,1% 0,2% 0,3%   0,0% 0,0% 0,8% 0,9% 
BTN GDPPC  Na 346 594 870  GIN 337 331 346 388 
 Seigniorage Na 1,1% 0,8% 1,0%   na na 0,4% 1,3% 
 Defor 0,0% -0,7% -0,1% -0,1%   0,0% 0,0% 0,3% 0,3% 
BWA GDPPC  792 1685 2642 3799  GMB 291 316 303 303 
 Seigniorage 0,6% 0,5% 0,2% 0,2%   1,6% 1,3% 0,9% 1,9% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 0,4% 0,4%   0,0% 0,0% -0,2% -0,2% 
CAF GDPPC  348 298 245 235  GNB 178 167 187 143 
 Seigniorage 1,4% 1,2% 1,7% -0,1%   na 6,6% 4,3% 1,9% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,1%   0,0% 0,0% 0,2% 0,2% 
CHL GDPPC  2175 2533 3918 5130  GNQ na 614 813 4920 
 Seigniorage 10,7% 0,8% 0,6% 0,2%   na -0,4% 0,1% 0,7% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% -0,2% -0,2%   0,0% 0,0% 0,4% 0,4% 
CHN GDPPC  143 277 572 1096  GTM 1458 1485 1538 1706 
 Seigniorage Na 3,0% 3,0% 1,6%   0,8% 0,7% 0,9% 0,6% 
 Defor 0,3% 0,3% -0,5% -0,8%   0,5% -0,5% 0,5% 0,6% 
CIV GDPPC  980 782 613 597  GUY 813 695 776 988 
 Seigniorage 1,9% 0,3% 1,0% 0,3%   1,4% 5,3% 3,7% 0,9% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,1% 0,0% -0,1%   0,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
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Appendix C (continued) 
 
 
70-79 80-89 90-97 98-05   70-79 80-89 90-97 98-05 
HND GDPPC  825 887 917 980  MWI 147 146 138 142 
 Seigniorage 0,9% 0,6% 1,4% 0,7%   0,5% 0,6% 1,5% 1,1% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 1,3% 1,4%   0,0% 0,0% 0,4% 0,4% 
IDN GDPPC  298 473 759 841  MYS 1405 2082 3175 3921 
 Seigniorage na 0,8% 0,7% 1,0%   1,5% 0,8% 0,8% 0,3% 
 Defor 0,2% 0,3% 0,7% 0,9%   0,0% -0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 
IND GDPPC  217 263 352 489  NAM na 1817 1697 1911 
 Seigniorage 1,0% 1,3% 1,5% 1,4%   na na 0,5% 0,2% 
 Defor -0,1% 0,0% -0,2% -0,1%   0,0% 0,0% 0,4% 0,4% 
KEN GDPPC  382 426 424 412  NER 270 221 175 167 
 Seigniorage 0,9% 0,7% 1,1% 0,4%   0,9% 0,3% 0,1% 0,5% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,1%   0,0% 0,0% 1,6% 0,8% 
KHM GDPPC  na na 224 316  NGA 427 349 370 383 
 Seigniorage na na 0,5% 0,7%   1,0% 1,2% 2,2% 1,1% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,4% 0,5% 0,8%   0,0% 0,1% 1,1% 1,4% 
KOR GDPPC  2530 4459 8332 11464  NIC 1347 899 664 780 
 Seigniorage 1,6% 0,6% 0,5% 0,1%   1,2% 321,7% 145,7% 0,6% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,1% 0,0% 0,0%   1,0% 1,2% 0,7% 0,6% 
LAO GDPPC  na 215 260 356  NPL 141 156 194 228 
 Seigniorage na na 0,5% 0,6%   0,9% 1,4% 2,2% 0,9% 
 Defor 0,3% 0,4% 0,2% 0,2%   0,6% 0,2% 0,9% 0,7% 
LBR GDPPC  817 601 108 152  PAK 288 393 500 548 
 Seigniorage na 1,0% na 0,3%   1,9% 2,0% 1,7% 1,5% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 0,7% 0,8%   0,1% -0,9% 0,7% 0,9% 
LKA GDPPC  374 506 663 883  PAN 3005 3225 3373 4014 
 Seigniorage 1,2% 1,1% 0,8% 0,6%   na na na 0,0% 
 Defor 0,2% -0,7% 0,5% 0,6%   0,3% 1,1% 0,1% 0,0% 
MDG GDPPC  369 284 240 231  PER 2197 2128 1816 2153 
 Seigniorage 0,7% 0,9% 1,3% 1,0%   1,7% 23,0% 41,9% 0,4% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 0,2% 0,2%   0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,1% 
MEX GDPPC  4080 4985 5123 5863  PHL 845 919 910 1020 
 Seigniorage 1,2% 2,6% 0,8% 0,6%   0,8% 0,9% 0,8% 0,5% 
 Defor 0,5% 0,0% 0,2% 0,2%   1,1% -0,4% 1,2% 1,0% 
MLI GDPPC  232 221 215 260  PNG 613 565 650 620 
 Seigniorage 1,8% 0,4% 1,0% 1,3%   0,2% 0,2% 0,3% 0,3% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 0,3% 0,3%   0,0% 0,0% 0,2% 0,2% 
MNG GDPPC  na 482 434 493  PRY 1011 1387 1438 1352 
 Seigniorage na na 4,5% 1,2%   1,2% 1,2% 1,2% 0,6% 
 Defor -0,1% 0,4% 0,3% 0,3%   0,1% 1,6% 0,4% 0,4% 
MOZ GDPPC  na 179 190 263  SDN 285 280 302 395 
 Seigniorage na 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%   0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,0% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,1%   0,0% 0,0% 0,3% 0,4% 
MRT GDPPC  477 439 419 424  SEN 495 459 426 464 
 Seigniorage 1,1% 0,8% 0,1% 0,0%   0,8% 0,7% 0,3% 0,8% 
 Defor 0,1% 0,1% 1,1% 1,4%   0,0% 0,0% 0,2% 0,2% 
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Appendix C (continued) 
 
 
70-79 80-89 90-97 98-05 
SLE GDPPC  279 278 208 177 
 Seigniorage 1,0% 4,5% 2,8% 1,3% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 0,3% 0,3% 
SLV GDPPC  2110 1624 1861 2137 
 Seigniorage 1,2% 0,1% -0,1% -0,3% 
 Defor 1,0% 1,4% 0,6% 0,7% 
SUR GDPPC  2660 2239 2036 2245 
 Seigniorage 1,3% 3,8% 13,4% 3,5% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
TCD GDPPC  202 170 177 202 
 Seigniorage 1,0% 0,7% 0,7% 0,6% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 0,3% 0,3% 
TGO GDPPC  307 290 246 245 
 Seigniorage 1,5% 0,4% 1,3% 0,1% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 1,4% 1,9% 
THA GDPPC  620 986 1854 2153 
 Seigniorage 1,1% 0,7% 0,9% 0,7% 
 Defor 1,4% 0,5% 0,3% 0,2% 
TZA GDPPC  na 257 255 286 
 Seigniorage na 1,9% 1,9% 0,8% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% 0,4% 0,5% 
UGA GDPPC  na 167 191 247 
 Seigniorage 2,0% 4,5% na 0,6% 
 Defor 0,2% 0,0% 0,8% 1,0% 
URY GDPPC  4343 4741 5643 6104 
 Seigniorage 4,3% 2,7% 2,1% 0,3% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,0% -2,0% -0,9% 
VEN GDPPC  6258 5134 5125 4691 
 Seigniorage 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
 Defor 0,4% -1,4% 0,2% 0,3% 
VNM GDPPC  na 207 281 441 
 Seigniorage na na 3,3% 2,7% 
 Defor 0,4% 1,1% -1,0% -0,9% 
ZAR GDPPC  307 239 139 87 
 Seigniorage 0,8% 2,9% 215,3% 36,7% 
 Defor 0,1% 0,3% 0,2% 0,1% 
ZMB GDPPC  531 417 338 325 
 Seigniorage 0,6% 1,8% 4,2% 0,7% 
 Defor 0,1% -0,1% 0,4% 0,4% 
ZWE GDPPC  629 613 626 545 
 Seigniorage Na 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
 Defor 0,0% 0,3% 0,6% 0,7% 
Source: Authors’ calculations from FAO, IFS, and WBI databases. 
 
